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THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: CONTINUITY IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY
ROBERT F. MEIER*
In a recent essay, Francis Allen warned that
"modern criminology is in danger of being enslaved
by its own emancipation."' Professor Allen's
despairing prognosis was occasioned by what he took
to be unsatisfactory developments in the manner in
which criminologists were selecting and approaching
their work. The emancipation Allen referred to is
that which had tied criminology to behavioral consid-
erations; the enslavement is that which presently
binds a new version of criminology to political
considerations.
The search for political meanings and motives in
the concept of crime and criminal behavior, which
Professor Allen deplores, is thought by many to be a
recent criminological development. Variously called
"critical," "radical" or "the new criminology," the
approach explicitly rejects more established para-
digms, which are claimed to be incompatible with an
acceptable social and humanistic view of crime and
its control. 2 There is, however, more to the new
criminology than the simple assertion that crime is a
political phenomenon, for such a statement would
merely be tautological. Laws obviously are passed
by political bodies, and these bodies are largely com-
mitted to the prevailing social system. This is the
case regardless of the economic system within which
the law-passing body operates. 3
The new criminology seems to be offering the
discipline a distinctive conceptual framework within
which to conduct its work. I will argue here,
however, that rather than presenting criminology
with a novel theoretical alternative, the new crimi-
nology has taken some of the discipline's more es-
tablished notions and rephrased them in political
terms. Specifically, one finds in the new criminology
elements of a social pathological view, extensions of
early University of Chicago criminology, an uneasy
reliance on functionalism, and an abiding faith in
labeling theory and its applications.
* Assistant Professor, Program in Social Ecology, Uni-
versity of California, Irvine.
'F. ALLEN, THE CRIMES OF PoLrrIcs 13 (1974).
'I. TAYLOR, P. WALTON, & J. YOUNG, THE NEW
CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE
(1973).
'van den Haag, No Excuses for Crime, 423 ANNALS 137
(1976).
The new criminology came forward increment-
ally; there was never a time when there was not a
new criminology, and then a time when there was.
The gradual development of the new criminology
has culminated in recent years in the establishment
of a specialized journal, a cadre of identifiable mem-
bers and relatively clear boundaries of study.
Gresham Sykes has claimed that the "radical"
criminology does in fact warrant the label "new"
since it is comprised of more than a series of ideas
differing only in emphasis from conventional crimi-
nology. Sykes maintains that
it does not appear that this new viewpoint in
criminology simply grew out of existing ideas in the
field in some.., automatic process where pure logic
breeds uncontaminated by the concerns and passions of
the times. Nor does it appear that a flood of new data
burst upon the field, requiring a new theoretical
synthesis.
Sykes believes that the advent of a new criminol-
ogy can only be understood as the result of the
sodohistorical forces which he believes were at work
in the 1960's. These include: 1) an increased cyni-
cism concerning the motives of those in power, the
credibility of official pronouncements and the institu-
tion of government itself; 2) the growth of a counter-
culture which began to alter popular images of
deviance and take more skeptical stances toward
traditional bases of authority; and 3) an increasing
politicalization of certain groups in American society
which had accumulated enough power to dispute
institutionalized discrimination and coercion. '
While this list may enumerate aspects of the
external environment in which the new criminology
arose, it does not account fully for its growth.
Scientific paradigmatic shifts do not come about as a
function of such mechanisms alone; they are also tied
"Sykes, The Rise of Critical Criminology, 65J. CR1M. L.
& C. 206, 211 (1974).
'See also Gibbons & Garabedian, Conservative, Liberal
and Radical Criminology: Some Trends and Observations,
in THE CRIMINOLOGIST: CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL 51 (C.
Reasons ed. 1974); Reasons, The Politicizing of Crime,




to internal intellectual developments in a discipline. '
While the time must be "ripe" for the growth and
eventual acceptance of intellectual alternatives, so too
must be the intellectual climate in which practition-
ers of a discipline operate.
The new criminology's challenge to traditional
perspectives is best understood by reference to the
general development of competing theories. Although
there is some dispute about the matter, sociologists of
science generally have come to believe that the
acceptance of a new perspective or theory is heavily
dependent on older views being unable to deal with
crucial problems, although this inability does not
seem to depend on the availability of empirical
evidence which runs counter to the older theory. In
this sense, theoretical growth of science is not
cumulative, but awaits the ascension of theoretical
alternatives to replace the "damaged," unfinished
theories. External forces (such as those described by
Sykes) might under such conditions seem to play a
determining role in the acceptance of the new
alternative by certain members of the discipline. But
this explanation overlooks the importance of inter-
nal, or discipline-specific, factors which are-
experienced by scholars in their scientific work. If,
as Kuhn and Lakatos claim, ' the eventual accept-
ance of a new theory occurs independent of empirical
support, certain crisis situations present in a dis-
cipline portend the search for new theoretical views
which will present practitioners with a different
array of intellectual puzzles and justifications for
their work, and which will point to the direction of
subsequent research.
THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY
It is necessary to be cautious when writing about
the new criminology. While the new criminologists
ostensibly encourage open dialogues concerning the
issues they raise, s they appear to be generally
suspicious of evaluative statements of their work, and
are apt to view such attempts as intellectual distrac-
'T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvOLU-
TIONS (1962).
7
KUHN, supra note 6, at 81; M. POLYANI, PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE 292 (1958); Lakatos, Falsification and the
Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, CRITI-
CISM AND THE GitowTH OF KNOWLEDGE 100-101 (I.
Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds. 1970).
'The editorial statement contained in the new criminol-
ogy's journal follows the traditional format for such decla-
rations: "Crime and Social Justice welcomes contributions
to all sections of the journal." 4 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 72
(1975).
tions. As one leading spokesman for the new crimino-
logy has put it:
We should welcome debates which allow us to
publicize and discuss our perspective, but at the same
time, must avoid cooptation and concentrate on ex-
tending and systematizing an authentically radical
criminology. '
Taking the risk, I will try to summarize some
main ideas of the new criminology. Since the purpose
of this essay is not essentially evaluative, " no
attempt will be made to develop these ideas or to
provide the kind of documentation offered by the new
criminologists. "
Like Sykes, " I find the new criminology to
be centered around a view of a society dominated by
an elite which uses the criminal law as a means of
meeting and controlling certain threats to the elite's
power and position. By employing the legal appara-
tus to define acceptable standards of conduct and to
repress that behavior (and those persons) who violate
'Platt, Prospects for a Radical Criminology in the
United States, 1 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 28 (1974). Note the
similarity between the foregoing and the following ex-
change:
"I want someone to tell me," Lieutenant Schiess-
kopf beseeched them all prayerfully. "If any of it is
my fault, I want to be told."
"He wants someone 'to tell him," Clevinger said.
"He wants everyone to keep still, idiot," Yos-
sarian answered.
J. HELLER, CATCH-22 at 68 (1961).
"Some evaluative statements have begun to appear. See
F. ALLEN, supra note 1; E. THoMPSON, WHIGS AND
HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BLACK ACT (1975);
E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CONCERNING
A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975); J. WiL-
SON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME (1975);- Carson, Sym-
bolic and Instrumental Dimensions of Early Factory
Legislation, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY
107 (R. Hood ed. 1975); Carson, The Sociology of Crime
and the Emergence of Criminal Laws, in DEVIANCE AND
SOCIAL CONTROL 67 (P. Rock & M. McIntosh eds. 1974);
Gibbs & Erickson, Major Developments in the Sociological
Study of Deviance, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF SOCIOLOGY 21
(A. Inkeles, J. Coleman & N. Smelser eds. 1975); Hirst,
Marx and Engels on Law, Crime, and Morality, in
CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 203 (I. Taylor, P. Walton, & J.
Young eds. 1975); Sykes, supra note 4; Turk, Prospects
and Pitfalls for Radical Criminology: A Critical Response
to Platt, 4 CRIME & SOC. JUST. 41 (1975) (see note 9
supra); van den Haag, supra note 3; Walker, Lost
Causes in Criminology, in CRIME, CRIMINOLOGY AND
PUBLIC POLICY (R. Hood ed. 1975).
"
5That I have been somewhat selective in choosing
which points I consider essential to the new criminology
will be obvious; the selection has been guided by the
nature of the argument presented here.
"
5 Sykes, supra note 4.
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such standards, the powerful are able to maintain
their privileged position. 13 The powerful are thus
seen as a self-interested lot who manipulate the legal
structure to their advantage. "' The maximization of
self-gain is the predominant motive guiding most, if
not all, elite behavior in this system of social,
political, and economic arrangements.
The meaning of crime in the new criminology is
less to be found in the willful violation of legal stat-
utes than in the conscious determination of stand-
ards which will serve the materialistic interests of
those who are able to participate in the legal-defini-
tion process. Criminal behavior becomes defined as a
function of social class position. "s The law of theft,
for example, is said to have been established by those
in power who have more to lose from thievery. The
law is almost invariably broken by persons in the
more powerless lower classes who experience greater
temptation toward theft.
The new criminology perceives crime as an immu-
table feature of capitalist society and its system of
political arrangements which guarantee the position
of an exploiting elite. "To locate the study of crime
within a broader quest for social justice demands
that one understand the relationship between crime
and the maintenance of privilege." "The system of
criminal justice is believed to be essentially coercive.
The elite rule less on authority than on power. The
ptswerless do not accept most criminal definitions on
the basis of perceived legitimacy, but rather conform
out of fear of force which the elite can bring to bear
on deviance. This force, embodied by the police,
courts, and correctional systems, serves the interests
of the powerful by enforcing their rules. 1 Since
system functionaries are recruited largely from the
powerless classes, the elite must coopt them into
their ideology through the inculcation of a "false
consciousness."
The new criminology implies that if the elite did
not control the criminal definition-process, a radical
"
5B. KRISBERG, CRIME AND PRIVILEGE (1975).
"The term self-interest is most often used to denote
selfishness, but there is a distinction: "Self-interest is the
satisfaction of one's desires; selfishness is the satisfaction of
one's desires at the expense of someone else." B. DUNHAM,
MAN AGAINST MYTH 41 (1947), quoted in H. SCHWEN-
DINGER & J. SdHWENDINGER, THE SOCIOLOGISTS OF
THE CHAIR 190 (1974).
"Chambliss, Functional and Conflict Theories of
Crime, 17 MSS Module 1 (1974). See also the revised
version of this paper in WHOSE LAW? WHOSE ORDER? 1
(W. Chambliss & M. Mankoff eds. 1976).
"
5 B. KRISBERG, supra note 13 at 30. [Emphasis added.)
"But see R. QUINNEY, CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER:
CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY (1974).
restructuring of the criminal code would result. This
view is a misinterpretation, however, since the new
criminologists do not call for the decriminalization of
offenses such as homicide, robbery and rape, about
which there is substantial consensus regarding their
seriousness and the necessity for control. Nor do they
claim that a socialist economic system would obviate
these acts. The confusion that has been generated in
this regard seems to stem from the new criminology's
tendency to cite with approval research on the
elite-supported origins of non-consensual crimes, "8
such as vagrancy, prostitution and the use of cer-
tain drugs. " It is implied that since all laws derive
from similar political processes, the prime mover for
all laws is some powerful elite. In the process the
distinction is blurred between laws which seem to
protect the interests of most persons (consensual
crimes) and those laws which protect the interests of
a smaller segment of society (non-consensual crimes).
In summary form, the tasks of the new criminolo-
gy have been: (1) to "demystify" criminal law, both
in its origins and applications, since to do so will
uncover the interests of the powerful; (2) to conduct
studies of social control agencies, bureaucracies, and
mass media to expose their complicity with an elitist
ideology; (3) to propose new criminal definitions
which, correcting the imbalance created by the elite's
influence on legislation, will include violations of
certain inherent rights; and (4) to put the new
criminology's theory into practice (termed "praxis")
by attempting to alter the existing economic and
political arrangements of capitalism, which are
believed to give rise to the present situation.
To examine the genesis of these ideas, I will
concentrate on the main perspectives in criminology,
roughly in order of their historical emergence. The
"social pathology view" was the first to be embraced
by criminology in this country. It was followed by the
"Chicago school of criminology," then by "function-
alism." The "labeling perspective" is the most recent
of the major criminological approaches. The new
criminology has borrowed selectively from each of
these positions in a synergistic manner.
SOCIAL PATHOLOGY
The social pathology approach to social problems
was based on an analogy which likened society to the
"
5J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCIETY (2d ed. 1952).
'
5 Chambliss, A Sociological Analysis of the Law of
Vagrancy, 12 Soc. PROB. 67 (1964); Roby, Politics and
Criminal Law: Revision of the New York State Penal Law
on Prostitution, 17 Soc. PROB. 83 (1969); T. DUSTER, THE
LEGISLATION OF MORALITY (1970).
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functioning of a biological organism. Social prob-
lems were those conditions which interferred with
the "normal" (i.e., "desirable") workings of soci-
ety. 2 Problems such as poverty, mental illness,
prostitution, and crime were condemned because
"everyone knew" them to be wrong. The social
pathological view, which came to prominence in the
early years of this century, was congruent with the
personal ideologies of its scholar-advocates. 2 The
social pathologists were recruited largely from small
midwestern communities and were imbued with a
sense of the importance of religion, as well as a dis-
trust of urban life. This "sacred provincialism" re-
sulted in a moralistic approach which not only called
attention to the existence of the "evil" of crime, but
also provided the element of moral censure requisite
to speed the correction of criminal behavior.
Though the new criminologists overtly reject the
social pathological approach to crime, they have
retained a number of its major features. The social
pathologists were concerned with the individual
pathology of criminals; the new criminologists deal
with the political pathology of capitalism. In the new
criminology, it is no longer the individual criminal
who is considered pathological (nor is the criminal's
illegal behavior necessarily considered pathological).
It is rather the social and political system which is
said to maintain the conditions which produce the
criminal and his behavior. The concept of pathology
is thus transferred from the actions of a powerless
criminal to the behavior of a powerful elite. Conse-
quently, the notion of pathology is aversive to the
new criminologists not on principle, but on the basis
of its misplaced application; simply put, the wrong
sources have received the pathology label.
The theoretical problem that this class emphasis
creates for the new criminology is often unrecognized
but is nevertheless substantial. The location of
"causes" of his behavior and the amount of influence
ascribed to those causes have implications for the
image of the deviant. If deviance is said to be
produced by forces external to the individual, he is
personally less responsible for his actions. In the new
criminology, the word "powerless" represents not
only a person's inability to participate effectively in
political and economic decisions which might affect
his life, but is also an appropriate adjective to
describe his lack of responsibility for his own
2
THE SOLUTION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS (E. Rubington
& M. Weinberg eds. 1971).
21See H. SCHWENDINGER & J. SCHWENDINGER, supra
note 14, who disagree with the well-known analysis of this
issue contained in Mills, The Professional Ideology of
Social Pathologists 49 AM.J. Soc. 165 (1943).
gists seem to subscribe to what Hollander22 has
termed "selective determinism." While the actions of
the mugger are deemed to be determined, those of the
price fixer are not; while the actions of the murderer
are the result of a repressive society, 2" the actions of
the corrupt politician are not.
There is a related view, which might be termed
"socialist utopian vision," which holds that once
people have enough of the basics, such as the right
kind of work and attractive opportunities for living
and learning, there will be no materialism and hence
no crime. While there may be some measure of truth
in this claim, it is not self-evident and it has not been
empirically demonstrated.
Declaring the actions of the powerless to be
attributable to morality and those of the powerful
attributable to materialism suggests a duality which
can be resolved only by making materialism a
function of power. If self-interest is defined in terms
of power, then only the powerful can act from this
motive. In this manner, the new criminologists invert
the premise of the social pathologists. The patholo-
gists claimed moral eminence only for the elite,
whose forward vision and proficiency were necessary
for a smoothly running, progressive society. The
powerful were the moral, political, and economic
leaders, while the powerless attempted to debase the
lofty intents of the elite.
The selection of those persons, behaviors, and
conditions considered pathological was made by the
pathologists on moralistic grounds bolstered by ele-
ments of social Darwinism. The content of the new
criminology is also ruled by moral, rather than
scientific, bases. "Liberal" criminology has used the
criminal law to define its boundaries: acts defined in
the statutes have formed the basis for criminological
inquiry. The new criminologists reject such a notion
and call for the criminalization (or, at least, the
study) of acts which are not presently criminal in a
strict legalistic sense. Racism, sexism, imperialism
and other forms of repression have been added to the
new criminologists' agenda. " It is argued that the
discipline of criminology should be humanistically
behavior. It is in this sense that the new criminolo-
2 2Hollander, Sociology, Selective Determinism, and the
Rise of Expectations 8 AM. SOCIOLOOIST 147 (1973).
2 A recent editorial in the new criminology's journal
dedicated that issue to one of the" former staff members of
the journal, Mary Gay, who had been killed by her
husband. The moral outrage such an act might otherwise
generate was tempered: "Mary Gay was beaten to death by
a man-her husband, who like her was a victim of a cruel
system." 4 CRIME & Soc. JUST. 64 (1975) (dedication).2 4Schwendinger & Schwendinger, Defenders of Order or
Guardians of Human Rights? 5 IssUEs CRIM. 123 (1970).
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oriented; that is, that criminology should serve the
powerless by studying conditions which inhibit or
destroy the free expression of uniquely human rights
and values. New criminologists do not deny that the
problems they choose to study are morally deter-
mined; indeed, they proclaim that problem-selection
based on any other criterion has never existed. 25
They maintain that they are merely being more
candid about exposing their values than traditional
criminologists, who often hide beneath a sea of
liberal rhetoric. In this way the new criminology,
rather than eschewing pathology, openly embraces it.
What has changed are those conditions considered
pathological, rather than the process by which such
an identification is made.
CHICAGO CRIMINOLOGY
Chicago sociology2 moved the concept of pathol-
ogy from the individual to the group level; it was no
longer persons who were pathological but communi-
ties (or, more precisely, "natural areas") that were
disorganized. This disorganization was the result of
a conflict of conduct norms among residents which
produced ambiguous or contradictory standards of
behavior. The concept of social disorganization
further shed its pathological connotation in the work
of Edwin H. Sutherland who talked of "differential
social organization" in his general theory of crime.
Marx stressed the notion of political conflict. The
fact that Marx had little to say about crime and law
could mean either that he had scant interest in the
subject, or that he had little insight into how this
particular behavior related to the political conflict he
described. The new criminology's use of the term
"conflict" with respect to criminal behavior appears
to derive from the Chicago tradition, rather than
from Marx. That the proletariat and the bourgeoisie
are in conflict over political power does not automati-
cally lead to the conclusion that the powerful
"create" crime, even though they may indeed control
the means which produce definitions of crime. And
even if that conclusion were demonstrated to be
correct, it would not necessarily account for the
powerless group behaving more criminally than the
powerful unless crime were defined in terms of
power, which would make this true by definition.
The Chicago theorists specified the relationship
between crime and conflict, characterizing conflict in
nonpolitical terms. Their theories, however, never
25Krisberg, Teaching Radical Criminology, 1 CRIME &
Soc. JUST. 64, 65 (1974).
2 R. FARIS, CHICAGO SOCIOLOGY (1967).
reached the societal level of generalization. 27 What
distinguishes the new criminology from previous
structural theories is its emphasis on the relationship
between political and economic factors on the one
hand, and social and legal factors on the other. The
roots of such a view can be traced to the work of
Willem Bonger. 2" The new criminologists pay an
intellectual debt to Bonger, "but find more contem-
porary meaning in the writings of prison inmates,
revolutionaries, and other political dissidents such as
George Jackson, Angela Davis, pre-1975 Eldridge
Cleaver, Franz Fanon, Malcolm X and Bobby
Seale.
Firsthand documentation of the repressive nature
of the capitalist society has come to be empirically
valued in the new criminology. But the use of such
documentation is not singular to the new criminol-
ogy; the Chicago theorists found substantial mean-
ing for their work in similar kinds of reports. "0 In-
deed, the utility of such accounts for both the Chi-
cago theorists and the new criminologists is re-
markably similar. Both are interested in the process
whereby a person comes to commit a criminal act.
What has changed is the location of the causes of
behavior. One wonders whether the new criminolo-
gists would find a political meaning in Shaw's
jackroller, and whether Sutherland would have been
able to locate aspects of differential association in the
life of Malcolm X.
The new criminology, as I have indicated, calls for
a critical reappraisal of legalistic or state definitions
of crime. Most of what is presently against the law, iH
is believed, probably should be outlawed, but there
also is much that is neglected in these provisions. The
most systematic statement of this issue is by the
Schwendingers s" who call for a redefinition of the
term "criminal" to include those conditions which
violate basic human rights and potentials. This call
"'This was accomplished by the functionalists; see text
accompanying notes 38-43 supra.
2 W. B ONGER, CRIMINALITY & ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
(1916).
2 The payment, however, is usually awkward since
Bonger has been considered to have used a "totally
unMarxist" approach in his work. I. TAYLOR, P. WALTON
& J. YOUNG, supra note 2, at 298, quoted in Gibbs &
Erickson, supra note 10, at 37-39.
"
0C. CONWELL, THE PROFESSIONAL THIEF (E. Suther-
land, 1937); C. SHAW, BROTHERS IN CRIME (1938);
C. SHAW, THE JACK-ROLLER (1930). More recent ex-
amples from this tradition can be found in W. CHAM-
BLIss, Box MAN: A PROFESSIONAL THIEF'S JOURNEY
(1972); B. JACKSON, OUTSIDE THE LAW: A THIEF'S
PRIMER (1972).
"Schwendinger & Schwendinger, supra note 24.
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for criminalizing certain acts of governments and
corporations, however, does not derive directly from
the new criminology, which has merely broadened
and made more political one of the more enduring
debates in criminology.
That the new criminology "discovered" the politi-
cal nature of law is untrue, and may be an example of
what Sorokin has called "intellectual amnesia." 32In
1933, for instance, the Bureau of Social Hygiene,
under the auspices of the Social Science Research
Council, published a report dealing with the feasibil-
ity of establishing an institute of criminology. This
document, known as the Michael and Adler
Report, 3 set about to review what was then known
about crime and to make recommendations concern-
ing the possibility of an institute from which public
policy planning might be made. The report noted
that it was necessary for the law to keep pace with
changing conditions: "It appears to be desirable that
the behavior content of the criminal law should keep
abreast of changes in behavior patterns or, at least,
that it should not lag too far behind." "'Michael and
Adler also note that: "It is highly questionable that
,sociology' and what is called 'political science' are
independent of each other." "
A few years later, Thorsten Sellin, under the
auspices of the Social Science Research Council, set
out to articulate some research directions for crimi-
nology. "' Sellin called for a redefinition of the tradi-
tional parameters of criminological inquiry and
maintained that focusing on the violations of conduct
norms would provide theoretically better substance
for criminology. Sutherland later entered this arena
in defense of his then newly-minted concept of
white-collar crime. Anticipating adverse reactions
from those who believed that the criminal law was
the only basis for the appellation "criminal," Suther-
land defended his position against the legalist, Paul
Tappan, in an exchange that anticipates much of the
Schwendingers' work of a generation later. 3
FUNCTIONALISM
That the new criminology should be "functional-
ist" is an outgrowth of the problems it deals with and
"
2P. SOROKIN, FADS AND FOIBLES IN MODERN SOCIOL-
oGY 3-20 (1956).
"J. MICHAEL AND M. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE (1933).
"Id. at 26.
"I1d. at 83 n.26.
"
6T. SELLIN, CULTURE CONFLICT AND CRIME (1938).
"
1Sutherland, Is 'White Collar Crime' Crime? 10 AI.
Soc. REV. 132 (1945); Tappan, Who Is the Criminal? 12
AM. SOc. REv. 96 (1947).
the general approach taken toward their solution.
Functional analysis, identified with persons whose
ideas on crime are deemed to be theoretically and
politically conservative, is a technique which
explores the underlying dimensions of problems,
looking for latent functions of features which have
manifest dysfunctions. Merton's" analysis of politi-
cal machines, Bell's 39 study of organized crime, and
Davis's ' investigation of prostitution all contain a
similar theme: that while these problems are mani-
festly dysfunctional for society, they all exhibit latent
functions which fuel and account for their existence.
The new criminology, too, uses this style of research
when examining the nature of crime and the func-
tions of the criminal law. Its concentration on the
society's elite foreshadows the conclusion that crime
is manifestly functional for the elite, allowing them to
use force to maintain their power, and latently
dysfunctional in fomenting proletariat resentment
and conflict.
Robert Merton is probably the most well-known
functionalist. Merton and the new criminologists
both stress social class position as a determinant of
criminality. Merton notes that a denial of access to
certain cultural goals and the ensuing frustration that
this engenders is not randomly distributed, but is
concentrated in the lower classes. 41 While Merton
views the location of crime in the lower classes as
problematic and in need of explanation, the new
criminology sees it as natural and politically inevita-
ble. This does not mean that official estimates are
necessarily accurate indicators of criminal behavior
(although such a position is not entirely incompatible
with the new criminology), but rather that there is a
lack of correspondence between the manifest and
latent functions of the figures. Rather than informing
us about the "correct" distribution of criminal
behavior, official crime statistics covertly instruct us
in the actions of agencies of social control, the
class-based definition of crime, and the image of what
is to be considered criminal. The political nature of
criminal statistics is revealed only by understanding
their latent functions.
If official records of crime are suspect, so too are
the motivations of those who construct those rec-
ords-the agents of social control. "' On the manifest
"
8R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUC-
TURE 72 (1957).
"
9D. BELL, THE END OF IDEOLOGY 115-58 (1960).
"
1 Davis, Prostitution, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL
PROBLEMS (R. Merton & R. Nisbet eds. 1966).41 R. MERTON, supra note 38, at 131-94.
4
2J. YouNG, THE DRUGTAKERS 174 (1971).
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level their motivations are objective: to document
violations of the normative demands of criminal law.
On the latent level, however, we find that the crimi-
nal justice system operates against the best interests
of the poor and powerless because it intends to do
so. ' This process of uncovering politically latent
meanings is what is meant by "demystifying" the
criminal law; that is, exposing the latent meanings
and intentions in capitalist society. Once we are able
to see below the powerful system of privilege mainte-
nance, the new criminology maintains, we will
uncover the real political plan.
The new criminology and Merton also share a
common image of a criminal. Within Merton's
perspective, the offender is one who has been unable
to compete equitably with others who are better
placed in society. But Merton's portrait of the
criminal is only half drawn. We are able to glimpse
something of the total picture in the "decision" of the
criminal to "innovate" (as Merton defines it), but we
are presented with the behavior rather than the
person. Thus, we are told of the structural antece-
dents (culturally prescribed goals and unavailable
means), the resulting personal frustration this gener-
ates, and the behavioral outcome (innovation); we
are given nothing of the deviant himself, aside from
his probable lower class status.
The new criminology presents a similarly incom-
plete picture of the offender. It locates a set of
structural antecedents (capitalism), the resulting
personal (i.e., political) frustration this arouses, and
the behavioral outcome (a political act, defined by the
elite as crime). We are given little information about
the deviant himself aside from his lower class posi-
tion. If Merton gives us a glimmer of a frustrated
person acting out of the same motivations for success
as everyone else, the new criminology presents a
more romantic, and at times heroic, image of the
offender. In the new criminology, offenders seem like
Robin Hoods. Merton and the new criminologists
agree on one thing: Merton's materialistically frus-
trated innovators and the new criminology's politi-
cally defiant freedom fighters would act differently
given a choice in the social structure. These criminals
are driven to their crimes, not attracted by them.
POLITICS AND LABELING
In one of the most widely cited works in the
sociology of deviance, Howard S. Becker 44 defines
4"Sykes, supra note 4.
"H. BECKER, OtrrsIERS (1963).
deviance relativistically: no behavior is inherently
deviant since deviance is not a quality of an act, but
the response of others to that act. "The deviant is one
to whom the label has successfully been applied;
deviant behavior is behavior that people so label." 45
The nature of the reaction is a function of social
groups who create deviance by making rules whose
infraction constitutes deviance, and who respond in
terms of the rules they have created. '"This reaction
is not random, but rather is patterned and purposely
given only to certain kinds of acts. This is why it is
essential to return to the rule creation process to see
whose rules are being broken. Becker informs us that
people are in fact always forcing their rules on
others, applying them more or less against the will and
without the consent of those others. ... Differences in
the ability to make rules and apply them to other
people are essentially power differentials (either legal
or extralegal).'
Such rules are said to be the "object of conflict and
disagreement, part of the political process of soci-
ety." "8 Becker identifies certain groups which are
particularly involved in creation of deviance, and
calls the members "moral entrepreneurs." 49
In addition to his emphasis on rule creation,
Becker stresses the importance of the administration
of those rules. Labeling theory shows that not only is
rule-making concentrated in the hands of select
groups, but that the application of criminal labels is
not a random phenomenon. Since rules are not made
to apply to all equally (they prohibit behavior that is
largely indigenous to the lower classes), it is not
surprising that the application of the law should







0From the labeling tradition the uses of official criminal
statistics have been most seriously questioned. These
statistics point clearly to the conclusion that "street" crime
is heavily concentrated in lower socio-economic groups.
While this conclusion has been attenuated (but only mildly)
by self-report and victimization studies which suggest a
slightly more even distribution of this behavior throughout
the class system, the claim is made that official statistics are
relatively accurate estimates, not of criminal behavior, but
of the actions of social control agencies. It is not evident
whether there really is more crime in the lower classes, thus
forcing the police to concentrate their efforts there, or
whether the police concentrate their efforts there for other
reasons. See Kitsuse & Cicourel, A Note on the Uses of
Official Statistics, 11 Soc. PROB. 131 (1963).
Richard Ericson," writing on the English new
criminologists, has observed that the new criminol-
ogy has been defined in terms of what it is not,
rather than what it is. " Ericson also notes the new
criminology makes extensive use of labeling theory
not only to orient members intellectually, but also to
utilize the "blaming quality" labeling theory pro-
vides. This quality arises from the configuration of
"causes" of deviance that labeling theory alleges. As
Becker and Horowitz have stated:
If sociology allows for a choice on the part of human
actors, then it can blame, by the way it assigns causes,
any of the people involved since they could have chosen
not to do what they did. This has consequences for the
political character of sociological analysis. "
The deviant in labeling theory is one whose
behavior, at least in its secondary aspects, has been
determined by the reactions of others. If he is not to
blame for this condition, the audience which reacted
to his behavior and thus perpetuated his deviance is
much less innocent.
The political nature of the new criminology,
summarized in the term "praxis" is, of course,
inescapable. In the dual role of scholar and activist,
the new criminologists have set for themselves an
ideal of practicing what they preach. The new
criminology offers not only a new theoretical alterna-
tive to traditional criminology, but also seeks to
provide scientific legitimacy to socialist political
activism. Critics of the new criminology have charged
that it is little more than "rhetoric." This charge is
sometimes dealt with by turning it back onto the
critic: "The problem of 'rhetoric' is ... bothersome
because the cry of 'too much rhetoric' itself can be a
rhetorical device that obscures the real issues
posed.... " 54
The rhetorical charge is a serious one, however,
and cannot be dismissed in so cavalier a fashion. If
the new criminology's claims to truth are based on
nothing more than a particular set of values and
moral positions, resolution of differences with oppo-
nents may not be possible. Acceptance of the new
criminology can then take place only in like-minded
persons, who do not perceive a general theoretical
"Ericson, British Criminology: A New Subject or Old
Politics?, 16 CAN. J. CRIM. & CORRECTIONS 352 (1974).
5 See also S. COHEN, THE IMAGES OF DEVIANCE 16
(1971); A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS IN SOCIOLOGY
20 (1970).5 Becker & Horowitz, Radical Politics and Sociological
Research, 78 AM.J. Soc. 58 (1972).
"
4 Krisberg, supra note 25, at 65.
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alternative. The new criminologists, not denying the
rhetorical nature of their scholarship, indicate that
this is the major reason why academic criminology
has been unreceptive to their ideas and why some
new criminologists have been denied university
tenure. As one group of new criminologists points
out: "To say that socialists are necessarily un-
scientific is the form that red-baiting takes in the
university." " Thus, tenure problems encountered
by two well-known criminologists have resulted,
say the new criminologists, from their particular
political views rather than the quality of their
scholarship.
Is this marriage of scholarship and political
activism unique to the new criminology? It would
appear not. The issue was identified and discussed
prior to the present advent of the new criminology,
particularly in the works of C. Wright Mills, "
Robert Lynd, " Howard Becker, "and Alvin Gould-
ner, " all of whom advocated vocationally-relevant
scholarship. While these persons may be thought of
as sympathetic intellectually to the new criminology,
their writings cannot be construed as being part of
the new criminology.
The overlap with labeling theory can be summa-
rized as follows: in both the new criminology and
labeling theory one sees concern with (1) the creation
and function of rules; (2) the enforcement of rules
(laws) for the benefit of the rule makers; (3) the effect
of the application of rules in the form of social control
for individuals; and (4) the politicalization of devi-
ants who see through the guise of the law to the true
nature of their own repression.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In addition to providing a valuable framework
within which to study rule making and rule applica-
tion, labeling theory contributed to the new crimino-
logy the idea that political considerations could be
fused to "scientific" information so that knowledge
and politics constituted two aspects of the same thing.
The foundations of praxis and the concern with
power and society lead inevitably to considerations of
the creation and application of rules. Because label-
5 Marzotto, Platt & Snare, A Reply to Turk, 4 CRIME &
Soc.JusT. 3, 44 (1975). See note 10 supra.
5 C. MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION (1959).57R. LYND, KNOWLEDGE FOR WHAT? (1939).
"
8 Becker, Whose Side Are We On? 20 Soc. PROB.
239 (1967).
"Gouldner, The Sociologist as Partisan: Sociology and
the Welfare State, 30 AM. SOCIOLOGIST 103 (1968).
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ing theory, for one reason or another, concentrated
on the consequences of the application of rules, the
way was cleared for the new criminology to focus on
rule-making as a substantive study area.
Criminology's interest in labeling theory also
arises, in some measure, from the theory's ability to
generate testable propositions which are derived
from an intuitively appealing but not self-evident
irony: social control efforts contain within them the
basis for their own justification.
The new criminology also begins with an irony,
but one derived from functionalism. Functionalism's
irony is that while problems have manifest dysfunc-
tions, they also have latent functions, and these latent
functions help explain the persistence of those prob-
lems. The new criminology extends this idea, but
with a twist. The new criminology (1) performs the
functional analysis not for society as a whole, but
only for the elite of that society, and (2) reverses the
characterization of manifest and latent contributions.
What is functional and dysfunctional largely depends
on the amount of power one possesses. The new
criminology pays little attention to the practical
functions and dysfunctions of crime, especially for the
powerless who have to bear the brunt of victimiza-
tion and repressive measures.
The Chicago school was the first to legitimize (1)
the explanatory concept of conflict (although it was
defined slightly differently here), and (2) the use of
first-person accounts of crime and empirical evidence
in support of theoretical positions. Within the work
of the Chicago school took place the beginnings of
discussions about the criminal law and its content
and scope.
The pathologists identified the genesis of social
problems as stemming from personal and group
inadequacies. The deviant was immoral and his
behavior in need of correction. The new criminology,
in its return to the pathological position, finds in the
actions of the elite a different location for what is
considered pathological. But if the pathologists'
approach to crime was dictated by the sacred, the
new criminologists employ secular (political) criteria
for their determination. The pathological stance is
maintained; it is only that new villains are identified.
The stuff of the new criminology is deeply rooted
in criminological theory. This is neither praise-
worthy, nor an indictment, since the utility of
criminological theory is founded on other criteria.
The developments in criminology and, indeed, in all
other disciplines, are rarely wholly creative. The
synergistic goal of the new criminology may be
nothing more than a spirited eclecticism with fancy
(and presently fashionable) political terms.
If much of the history of criminological theory in
the United States can be seen as a reaction to
pathology 6 0 (and that reaction has been increasing in
recent years), "the new criminology is likely to draw
sharp criticism. Francis Allen's fear, noted at the
outset of this article, is neither a conservative lament
nor misplaced antagonism. If criminology is indeed
in danger of being enslaved by its own emancipation,
it would appear its captive will be in the form of an
old, rather than a new, jailer.
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